4. Behavioral Insurance

Till Stowasser

University of Stirling

Insurance Economics (LMU, 2024)

∃►

< □ ▶

Э.

SQ (~

Background I

- Traditional economic theory treats individuals as homo oeconomicus
 - calculating, self-interested, utility maximizers making entirely rational consumption and investment decisions
- However: Evidence abounds that individuals regularly (and systematically!) violate principles of rational judgment and decision-making.
- We are not homo oeconomicus.
- We are homo sapiens. And homo sapiens has a pretty bad track record when it comes to making good (or rationally optimal) choices.
- Reason: We are (at best) boundedly rational
 - Biased perceptions Tables
 - Limited cognitive abilities
 - Limited attention
 - Limited self-control
 - Over-confidence (especially about our future self)
 - Loss aversion
 - Status-quo bias
 - Reliance on biased (anchoring, salience, similarity) rules of thumb

Э.

- These anomalies have major implications for how individuals make insurance decisions and how they respond to product offerings, price changes, promotions, and marketing messages.
 - Behavioral biases lead to systematic deviations from optimal choice in insurance decisions (undersaving for retirement, choosing sub-optimal health-care plans, buying unnecessary insurance) approved
 - Exploitation of behavioral biases by shrewd insurance firms to buy (over-priced) insurance that nobody needs ⇒ Policy question: How can vulnerable consumers be protected (Behavioral consumer protection)?

Lo Behavioral IO

< ロ > < 同 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > <

Э.

Why are insurance markets prone to behav. biases?

- Many products are inherently complicated
 - Complex charging structures lead to simplified decisions
- Products involve trade-offs between present and future
 - e.g., Instant gratification versus future self
- Decisions involve assessments of risk and uncertainty
 - Biases in judgments of risk and frequency: availability, representativeness, anchoring etc.

Decisions can be emotional

- Stress, fear, regret instead of cost and benefit (e.g. accident insurance, travel insurance)
- Little learning from past mistakes
 - Decisions are often infrequent and learning is far from immediate (e.g. retirement plan)

To Inertia

- Status Quo Bias: Individuals tend toward inaction, with roots in loss aversion (to making a risky choice) and the *endowment effect* in which people value what they currently own more than similar options available in the marketplace
 - Implication for Insurance: Individuals and companies may go years without thoroughly assessing coverage adequacy or testing prices, even though they are aware that their needs have changed and opportunities to improve coverage and/or reduce premium exist.
- Choice Overload: In the face of too much information, individuals may freeze and make no decision at all
 - **Implication for Insurance:** Insurance buying can be a complex process, with many terms, conditions, and risk tradeoffs to be considered. In the face of this complexity, buyers may refuse to add or change coverage, even for a recognizable benefit.

Э.

< □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ >

- Availability Bias: Individuals assess the probability/relevance of events by the ease with which examples come to mind. Risk assessments can be biased by improbable but vivid personal experiences
 Implication for Insurance: People carry (personally) unnecessary insurance (accident insurance) while undersaving for retirement insurance
- Framing: Product choices by individuals are influenced by the way in which options are presented (choice architecture)
 Implication for Insurance: Simply by presenting insurance options in a clever (misleading) way, insurance providers can sell unnecessary (or overpriced insurance)

E.

Economist.com	SUBSCRIPTIONS
OPINION	Welcome to
WORLD	The Economist Subscription Centre
BUSINESS	Disk the type of extreminities you want to have
FINANCE & ECONOMICS	or renew
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY	or renew.
PEOPLE	Economist.com subscription - US \$59.00
BOOKS & ARTS	One-year subscription to Economist.com.
MARKETS & DATA	Includes online access to all articles from
DIVERSIONS	The Economist since 1997.
	One-year subscription - US \$125.00 One-year subscription to the print edition of The Economist.
	Print & web subscription - US \$125.00 One-year subscription to the print edition of <i>The Economist</i> and online access to all articles from <i>The Economist</i> since 1997.

Economist.com	SUBSCRIPTIONS		
OPINION	Welcome to		
WORLD	The Economist Subscription Centre		
BUSINESS	Pick the type of subceription you want to huv		
FINANCE & ECONOMICS	or renew		
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY			
PEOPLE	□ Economist.com subscription - US \$59.00		
BOOKS & ARTS	One-year subscription to Economist.com.	16 %	
MARKETS & DATA	Includes online access to all articles from	10 /0	
DIVERSIONS	The Economist since 1997.		
	□ Print subscription - US \$125.00 One-year subscription to the print edition of The Economist.	0 %	
	Print & web subscription - US \$125.00 One-year subscription to the print edition of The Economist and online access to all articles from The Economist since 1997.	84 %	

Framing example

Economist.com	SUBSCRIPTIONS		
OPINION	Welcome to The Economist Subscription Centre Pick the type of subscription you want to buy		
WORLD			
BUSINESS			
FINANCE & ECONOMICS			
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY	or renew.		
PEOPLE	Economist.com subscription - US \$59.0		
BOOKS & ARTS	One-year subscription to Economist.com. Includes online access to all articles from		
MARKETS & DATA			
DIVERSIONS	The Economist since 1997.		
	Print & web subscription - US \$125.00 One-year subscription to the print edition of The Economist and online access to all articles from The Economist since 1997.		

.0

Economist.com	SUBSCRIPTIONS		
OPINION	Welcome to		
WORLD	The Economist Subscription Centre		
BUSINESS	Pick the type of subscription you want to buy		
FINANCE & ECONOMICS	or renew.		
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY	of renew.		
PEOPLE	Economist.com subscription - US \$59.00		
BOOKS & ARTS	One-year subscription to Economist.com.		0/
MARKETS & DATA	Includes online access to all articles from	00	/0
DIVERSIONS	The Economist since 1997.		
	Print & web subscription - US \$125.00 One-year subscription to the print edition of The Economist and online access to all articles from The Economist since 1997.	32	%

E.

 $\mathcal{O} \mathcal{Q} \mathcal{O}$

<ロ > < 回 > < 巨 > < 巨 > < 巨 > <

Framing example II



Framing example III

Shop for handbags on Google







H&M -Handtasche - ... €39,99 H&M + €4,90 shipping



Saint Laurent Klassische Nano €1.490,00 Yves Saint Laur... + €13,50 shipping



Dolce & Gabbana - Sicily €1.150,00 NET-A-PORTER g Free shipping

WIR EMPFEHLEN IHNEN





Bedruckte iPhone 7 Plus-Hülle aus strukturierte... €135



DOLCE & GABBANA

Bedruckte iPhone 7 Plus-Hülle aus strukturierte... €355

DOLCE & GABBANA

Hülle aus strukturierte...

Bedruckte iPhone 7-

€325

▶ ◀ Ē ▶

王

Framing example IV

E.

5900

<ロト < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > <

Behavioural Industrial Organisation (IO)

HANDBOOK OF Blgar **Behavioral Industrial** Organization

5) 5

< □ ▶

Edited by Victor J. Tremblay • Elizabeth Schroeder **Carol Horton Tremblay**



Paul Heidhurg Bofond Koszegi

E

SQ (~

∃ ▶ ∢ ∃ ▶

- Combines Behavioural Economics with standard IO (intersection of theory of the firm and theory of markets)
- Main themes:
 - How rational firms interact with consumers who make systematic mistakes in evaluating products
 - How rational firms respond to consumer preferences that differ from those usually assumed in IO
 - What policy insights (especially on issues in competition and consumer-protection policy) follow from this
- A selection of topics: Relative thinking, salience, shrouded attributes, confirmation bias, loss aversion, overconfidence, status-quo bias, ...

Approach to classifying behavioral biases

(2009) FECONDIT



VIJ. Ke Malmendier

 Stefano Della Vigna's distinction between preferences, beliefs and decision-making

 $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{A} \mathcal{A}$

< □ ▶

Approach to classifying behavioral biases

Ten behavioural biases and effects in retail financial markets

Our preferences are influenced by emotions and psychological experiences	Rules of thumb can lead to incorrect <mark>beliefs</mark>	We use decision-making short-cuts when assessing available information
Present bias e.g. spending on a credit card for immediate gratification Reference dependence and loss aversion e.g. believing that insurance added on to a base product is cheap because the base price is much higher Regret and other emotions e.g. buying insurance for peace of mind	Overconfidence e.g. excessive belief in one's ability to pick winning stocks Over-extrapolation e.g. extrapolating from just a few years of investment returns to the future Projection bias e.g. taking out a payday loan without considering payment difficulties that may arise in the future	 Framing, salience and limited attention e.g. overestimating the value of a packaged bank account because it is presented in a particularly attractive way Mental accounting and narrow framing e.g. investment decisions may be made asset-by-asset rather than considering the whole investment portfolio Decision-making rules of thumb e.g. investment may be split equally across all the funds in a pension scheme, rather than making a careful allocation decision Persuasion and social influence e.g. following financial advice because an adviser is likeable

 $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{A} \mathcal{A}$

Box 1: Does loss-aversion reflect genuine preferences?

When analysing whether loss-averse choices represent a genuine preference to which we should give credence the following questions are useful:

- Do consumers correctly anticipate (e.g. when buying insurance) the emotional detriment that they would feel if exposed to a loss?
- Is the reference point against which consumers are evaluating losses reasonable and sufficiently consistent to suggest stable underlying preferences?
- Is there evidence that the loss-averse preferences for a particular product are being 'manufactured' by suppliers, for example by manipulating the reference point or framing the problem to over-emphasise the likely impact of the loss?

SQ P

- Should policy intervene at all?
- If so, how restrictive/strict should interventions be?
 - Bans/mandates versus "softer" interventions
 - More recently: Can we use behavioral insights to improve decisons? ⇒ The Nudge debate

Thaler and Sunstein: Nudge



"One of the few books . . . that fundamentally changes the way I think about the world." - Steven D. Levitt, coauthor of FREAKONOMICS

< □ > < □ > < □ > .

< ∃ >

王

• Thaler/Sunstein (2008): A nudge, as we will us the term, is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not.

 $\land \land \land \land$

- Sounds like an oxymoron.
- Thaler/Sunstein try to combine two opposing schools of thought (not least in an attempt to make nudging theory appear apolitical)
- Liberterian element: People are free to do what they like (no enforcement).
- Paternalistic element: Choice architects try to influence behavior of individuals so they make better choices "as judged by themselves".

 $\land \land \land \land$

An example for a nudge



Till Stowasser (University of Stirling)

P

5900

玊

- 1. Regulation (e.g. bans or mandates)
- 2. Economic incentives
- 3. Information

.∢ ⊒ ▶

ΞÞ

< □ ▶

÷.

- 1. Regulation (e.g. bans or mandates)
- 2. Economic incentives
- 3. Information
- 4. Nudges

. ₹ 🖬 🕨

< □ ▶

Э.

- 1. Regulation (e.g. bans or mandates)
- 2. Economic incentives
- 3. Information
- 4. Nudges
 - Non-evasive and liberty preserving
 - Effective 7

7 Radical incrementalism

- Cheap
- Too good to be true?

'∃ ▶ ∢ ∃ ▶

< □ ▶

E.

- 1. Regulation (e.g. bans or mandates)
- 2. Economic incentives
- 3. Information
- 4. Nudges
 - Non-evasive and liberty preserving
 - Effective
 - Cheap
 - Too good to be true?

< ∃ ▶

< □ ▶

E.

- Because we are **not** homo oeconomicus.
- Recall: We are homo sapiens. And homo sapiens has a pretty bad track record when it comes to making good (or rationally optimal) choices.

∢ ⊒ ▶

< □ ▶

E.

- This does not mean that homo oeconomicus is infallible.
- Homo oeconomicus can make mistakes, but (s)he is not systematically biased when making decisions.
- Nudging takes behavioral biases in decision-making into account and aims at minimizing them. Goal: Nudge homo sapiens towards decisions that homo oeconomicus would have made.
- Homo sapiens may benefit from nudges. Homo oeconomicus would not (they are irrelevant).

Nudge: Goal: Improve de com "as judged themselveg" Dark Nudge: Nudge aimed at behaviour against ont's interest Sludge: Nudge to make behaviour dange more difficult

 $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{A} \mathcal{A}$

◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆ □▶ ◆ □▶ ● □

Foundation: Automatic vs. reflective cognitive system

Econs: Reflective system



- Controlled
- Effortful
- Deductive
- Slow
- Self-aware
- Skilled

_

< □ ▶

E.

Foundation: Automatic vs. reflective cognitive system

, System 2

Econs: Reflective system



- Controlled
- Effortful
- Deductive
- Slow
- Self-aware
- Skilled

System (Kalman)

Humans: Automatic system



< □ ▶ < ⊡ ▶

- Uncontrolled
- Effortless
- Associative
- Fast
- Unconscious
- Rule-following

E.

- Decision problems of high complexity
- Decision problems with low frequency
- Decision problems with limited **feedback** about consequences
- Decision problems with high levels of uncertainty
- Decision problems with immediate benefits and postponed cost
- Unfortunately, these are typically the most important decisions in life (investments in health, education, savings, etc.)

 $\land \land \land \land$

Six principles of good choice architecture

- 1. Defaults
- 2. Expect and forgive error
- 3. Give feedback
- 4. Help people understand mapping from choice to welfare
- 5. Structure complex choices
- 6. Use incentives in your favor

< ∃ ▶

÷.

Six principles of good choice architecture

- 1. Defaults
- 2. Expect and forgive error
- 3. Give feedback
- 4. Help people Understand mapping from choice to welfare
- 5. Structure complex choices
- 6. Use iNcentives in your favor

∢ ⊒ ▶

÷.

- 1. Nudging theory has become fairly **popular among policymakers** (especially in the UK and USA)
- 2. Applications in all domains of life
- 3. One of the most practically relevant contributions of behavioral economics.
- 4. Also quite **trendy topic in academia** (perhaps even more so after Thaler's Nobel prize)

E.

 $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{A} \mathcal{A}$

]] **) |] |**

- At the same time, nudging has also been subject to harsh criticism across many disciplines (Philosophy, Economics, Psychology, Law)
 - Nudges are manipulative (and much more paternalistic than claimed)
 - Nudges are prone to exploitation
 - Nudges are incompatible with the rule of law
 - Nudges fail to induce long-term behavioral changes
 - Nudges cannot be a substitute for (more expensive) traditional policy instruments but are often used this way

E.

Real-world application of nudges

sach wind

care (Choice 1 : Enrill? Choice 2 Plan Choice 2 Choice

Health insurance: Medicare Part D versus Obamacare

- In 2006 Medicare Part D was introduced to provide insurance for drug expenses for the elderly population in the US
 - Mantra back then: Choice, choice, choice
 - Results: Many choices were horrible because they became very complex.
- Lessons learnt for the ACA (aka Obamacare) in 2014
 - Provide a complexity-reducing choice environment on plan-finder website
- Similar learning curve in part-privatization of retirement insurance in Sweden

 $\checkmark \land \land \land$

Real-world application of nudges (David Latan)

Retirement insurance: Save More Tomorrow

- In the late 1990's, Richard Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi designed a novel program to increase savings rates in 401K plans.
- Working with companies and investment managers, they developed the "Save More Tomorrow" investment plan.
- Has two basic components:
 - Individuals were approached several months in advance of scheduled pay increases and asked to pre-commit to increasing their 401K savings rate coincident with those increases, by an amount that would result in no visible decrease in takehome pay
 - Individuals were also asked to set up an automated increase in their contribution rate coinciding with each scheduled future raise up to a pre-set maximum.
- Individuals were also asked to set up an automated increase in their contribution rate coinciding with each scheduled future raise up to a pre-set maximum.
- Is now widely used in the United States as (default!) policy

伺▶ ◀ ▤▶ ◀ ▤▶

A shameless plug: MSc Behavioural Science Stirling



https://www.stir.ac.uk/courses/pg-taught/behavioural-science

 $\checkmark Q ()$

< □ ▶

Biased perceptions: Shepard Tables



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XFaUnGVAcmc



-

< □ ▶

÷.

SQ (~

Biased perceptions: The dress



Back

∢ ≣ ▶

<ロ > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 >

臣